Zimbabwe stands at what may prove to be one of the most consequential constitutional moments in its post-independence history. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Cabinet has reportedly approved sweeping amendments that fundamentally alter how the State is structured, how the President is chosen, and how democratic institutions function. The scale and structural weight of these proposed changes invite comparison to 1987, when Zimbabwe abandoned the Westminster-style prime ministerial system and adopted an executive presidency — a move that concentrated power in a single office and reshaped the nation’s political trajectory for decades.
The proposed reforms represent not just technical adjustments, but a re-engineering of the architecture of governance. At their core lies a consolidation of executive authority, a weakening of direct democratic participation, and an extension of political tenure. Together, they mark a watershed shift in Zimbabwe’s constitutional order.
1. Removal of Direct Presidential Elections
Perhaps the most far-reaching proposal is the removal of direct presidential elections. Under the current constitutional arrangement, Zimbabwean citizens directly vote for their President. This system, while imperfect in practice, preserves the principle that sovereignty ultimately rests with the people.
Shifting presidential election to Parliament fundamentally alters this relationship. In theory, parliamentary election of a President can function in stable multiparty democracies. However, in a dominant-party system like Zimbabwe’s — where ZANU-PF maintains overwhelming control of Parliament — the change effectively ensures that the ruling party’s parliamentary majority will determine the presidency.
This removes citizens’ direct voice in choosing the Head of State. It transforms the presidential race from a national contest of ideas into an internal parliamentary calculation. Public legitimacy may diminish because the President would no longer carry a direct electoral mandate from the people. In practice, it entrenches the power of whichever party commands Parliament — and at present, that is ZANU-PF.
Historically, Zimbabwe has witnessed interesting electoral patterns: ruling party parliamentary candidates often outperform their presidential candidate, while opposition presidential candidates frequently outperform their party’s parliamentary slate. By shifting presidential selection to Parliament, this dynamic disappears. The presidency becomes a derivative of parliamentary dominance, not popular appeal.
2. Extension of Presidential and Parliamentary Terms
The proposal to extend terms from five years to seven significantly lengthens the political cycle. Democratic systems rely on regular elections as mechanisms of accountability. Frequent elections allow citizens to assess performance and renew or withdraw their mandate.
Extending terms delays that accountability. In contexts where institutions are already fragile and oversight mechanisms weak, longer terms can entrench incumbency advantages. It increases the cost and difficulty of political renewal. Citizens must wait longer to express dissatisfaction through the ballot box.
In mature democracies, longer terms may be balanced by strong checks and independent institutions. In Zimbabwe’s case, critics argue that institutional weaknesses make extended tenure a risk factor for democratic stagnation.
3. Increased Presidential Influence in Parliament
Granting the President authority to appoint additional senators expands executive reach into the legislative branch. Appointed legislators often align with the appointing authority, especially in highly centralized political systems.
Parliament’s constitutional role is to legislate and to oversee the executive. When the executive directly shapes legislative composition, the boundary between oversight and loyalty blurs. Parliamentary independence weakens, and accountability mechanisms may become symbolic rather than substantive.
This structural expansion of executive influence further shifts the balance of power away from separation and toward consolidation.
4. Transfer of the Voters’ Roll to the Registrar-General
Electoral credibility depends on institutional independence. Moving custody of the voters’ roll from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to the Registrar-General introduces significant concerns about transparency.
The Registrar-General’s office has historically been viewed by critics as closely aligned with the executive. Electoral management bodies are typically designed to be independent precisely to avoid perceptions of political manipulation. Transferring control of such a sensitive instrument as the voters’ roll risks undermining public trust in elections.
Confidence in electoral systems is not merely procedural — it is psychological and political. Once public trust erodes, legitimacy becomes fragile.
5. Fragmentation of Electoral Management
Creating a separate Delimitation Commission to handle constituency boundaries removes that responsibility from ZEC. While proponents may argue this improves specialization, fragmentation of electoral functions can produce coordination challenges and inconsistencies.
Delimitation — the drawing of constituency boundaries — is one of the most politically sensitive aspects of electoral systems. It can determine outcomes before votes are even cast. Separating it from the main electoral authority creates space for politicization if safeguards are not robust.
6. Weakening Judicial Appointment Transparency
Public interviews for judicial appointments were introduced to enhance openness and public confidence. They allowed citizens to observe candidates’ qualifications and judicial philosophies. Removing this transparency reduces scrutiny and may increase perceptions of political influence over the judiciary.
An independent judiciary is a cornerstone of constitutional democracy. It acts as guardian of the Constitution and referee of disputes. When judicial appointments become less transparent, public confidence in impartial adjudication diminishes.
7. Security Sector Constitutional Dilution
The proposed shift in language governing the Defence Forces — from “upholding the Constitution” to acting “in accordance with the Constitution” — may appear subtle but carries interpretive weight.
The former implies an active guardianship role; the latter suggests passive compliance. Constitutional language matters because it shapes institutional culture and legal interpretation. Even nuanced wording can influence how security forces understand their duty to the State and its citizens.
8. Abolition of the Gender Commission
Dedicated institutions for gender equality exist because systemic inequality requires focused oversight. Folding the Gender Commission into the Human Rights Commission may dilute attention to gender-specific issues.
In societies with persistent gender disparities, specialized oversight bodies play a critical role in monitoring compliance, advocating reform, and ensuring visibility of women’s rights. Their abolition risks marginalizing gender concerns within broader human rights frameworks.
Structural Consequences
Taken together, these amendments centralize authority in the executive, extend tenure, increase executive influence over Parliament, reshape electoral systems, and reduce institutional independence. The cumulative effect is not a minor reform, but a structural transformation.
Comparisons to 1987 are instructive. That year marked the birth of the executive presidency — a move that consolidated political authority and reshaped Zimbabwe’s governance model. Today’s proposed changes may not be identical, but they are comparable in structural impact.
If enacted, they could permanently alter Zimbabwe’s democratic landscape.
Political Implications for the Opposition
Under a parliamentary presidential election system, the opposition’s path to power narrows significantly. Fragmentation becomes fatal. A divided opposition cannot win Parliament — and without Parliament, it cannot win the presidency.
The reforms effectively demand a broad, grassroots-based opposition movement rather than one centered on a charismatic leader. Otherwise, power remains structurally locked within the dominant party.
The phenomenon known as Bhora Musango — where ruling party legislators under-campaign for their presidential candidate while focusing on their own survival — would also disappear. Members of Parliament would have direct incentive to ensure parliamentary dominance, since Parliament would now elect the President.
A Personal Reflection
As I reflect on these developments, I cannot detach them from my own life story.
I was born in Zimbabwe — a country rich in potential but constrained by politics, economic instability, and limited opportunity. Like many young Zimbabweans, I have struggled to carve out a path in a system where access often depends not just on merit, but on networks, political alignment, and survival instincts.
When institutions weaken, it is not abstract. It is personal.
When accountability is delayed, it is not theoretical. It shapes whether young people believe effort will be rewarded. When political power becomes more centralized and less responsive, opportunity narrows further for those of us born without privilege or proximity to power.
Every constitutional shift that reduces transparency, competitiveness, or accountability deepens the sense of exclusion felt by ordinary citizens. For people like me — Zimbabweans born with limited opportunities — these changes do not merely alter governance structures. They further entrench a system in which advancement feels distant and fragile.
I have struggled to make it in life not because of lack of ambition, but because the ecosystem around me often feels designed to preserve itself rather than uplift its people. And when constitutional amendments consolidate power instead of dispersing it, the ladder of mobility becomes even steeper.
This moment will be remembered. The question is whether it will be remembered as consolidation for stability — or consolidation at the expense of democratic promise.
For Zimbabwe, and for those of us still striving within it, the stakes could not be higher.
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